LEAST COST EFFICIENCY OF AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

The study evaluates the efficiency of government intervention using a vertical structured model including imperfectly competitive agricultural input markets, the bread grains market, and the imperfectly competitive food industry. The actually observed policy is compared to a hypothetical optimal policy of the same policy instruments to test for policy efficiency.Agricultural and Food Policy, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,

Was the Austrian agricultural policy least cost efficient?

The study evaluates the efficiency of government intervention using a vertical structured model including imperfectly competitive agricultural input markets, the bread grain market, and the imperfectly competitive food industry. To test for policy efficiency the actually observed bread grain policy is compared to a hypothetical efficient policy. To account for the sensitivity of the results in regard to the model parameter values computer-intensive simulation procedures and surface response functions are utilized.agricultural policy; efficient combination of policy instruments; statistical welfare analysis

TESTING FOR EFFICIENCY: A POLICY ANALYSIS WITH PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS

The study evaluates the efficiency of government intervention using a vertical structured model including imperfectly competitive agricultural input markets, the bread grain market, and the imperfectly competitive food industry. To test for policy efficiency the actually observed bread grain policy is compared to a hypothetical efficient policy. To account for the sensitivity of the results in regard to the model parameter values computer-intensive simulation procedures and surface response functions are utilized.agricultural policy, efficient combination of policy instruments, statistical policy analysis, Productivity Analysis,

ESTIMATION OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN FOOD MARKETING: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN BANANA MARKET

Several studies have estimated the welfare effects of recent changes in the European Union's common policy on banana imports, based upon the assumption that the market is perfectly competitive. However, if the market is imperfectly competitive, predictions about changes in banana policy may be inaccurate. The objective of this paper is to estimate the degree of market imperfection in the German market for banana imports using dynamic methods. The hypothesis that this market is perfectly competitive is rejected, and, in addition, the degree of market imperfection is estimated to be higher using a dynamic model compared to previous static estimates.Marketing,

Dynamic General Equilibrium Models with Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets

This paper discusses the consequences of introducing imperfectly competitive product markets into an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model. We pay particular attention to the consequences of imperfect competition for the explanation of fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. Market structures considered include monopolistic competition, the 'customer market' model of Phelps and Winter, and the implicit collusion model of Rotemberg and Saloner. Empirical evidence relevant to the numerical calibration of imperfectly competitive models is reviewed. The paper then analyzes the effects of imperfect competition upon the economy's response to several kinds of real shocks, including technology shocks, shocks to the level of government purchases, and shocks that change individual producers' degree of market power. It also discusses the role of imperfect competition in allowing for fluctuations due solely to self-fulfilling expectations.

Grain Distribution in Ghana under Imperfectly Competitive Market Conditions

Interspatial and intertemporal grain distribution in Ghana is a private sector activity carried out mainly by traders. These traders sometimes collude to maximize their joint profits. By so doing they influence the conduct of the grains market. To examine the effect of their actions on the informal maize market in Ghana, a spatial equilibrium model was estimated under three scenarios: (1) Perfect competition, (2) Cournot-Narsh conjectures, and (3) Collusion. The results indicate that imperfect competition distorts grain flows, reduces consumer welfare and depresses traders’ sales revenue. Collusive behavior of traders, on the other hand, causes the greatest distortion of grain flows as well as trader and consumer welfare. These results draw attention to policy makers and development agents to educate traders against using their associations to foster collusion.Spatial equilibrium, monopoly, imperfect competition, interspatial, Cournot- Narsh conjectures, Crop Production/Industries, D4, L1,

Patent protection and innovation in a vertical structure

We show a new way through which patent protection affects innovation. We show that patent protection may reduce the final goods producers' incentives for innovation in industries with imperfectly competitive input markets. The input market structure may play an important role in this respect.Patent protection; Innovation; Input market

How labor markets and imperfect competition affect tariff policy

Protection may be a second-best policy when the domestic sector is imperfectly competitive. But the optimal tariff depends on labor market institutions too. The author considers two theoretical settings. The first is fully centralized wage bargaining, where all workers are unionized and wage differentials are redistributed among workers (the Scandinavia case). The second is negotiation at the firm level, where workers are unionized in imperfectly competitive sectors only, and wages may differ from sector to sector (the Latin America case). He uses the case of the competitive labor market as a benchmark. In Scandinavia, free trade maximized welfare. The central trade union internalizes the consequences of imperfect competition in the domestic sector. Since prices in this sector are a mark-up over labor costs, there is a wedge between the sectoral productivities of labor and, therefore, an inefficient allocation of manpower. By choosing a moderate wage, the central trade union replicates the effects of a subsidy to the imperfectly competitive sector so that no government intervention is required. In Latin America, decentralized wage bargaining increases the wedge between the sectoral productivities of labor. While wages in the export sector are constrained by harsh competition in world markets, trade unions in the domestic sector can get higher wages without completely squeezing labor demand. An import tariff improves manpower allocation by reorienting demand toward the domestic sector. Since the second-best tariff is strictly positive, opening the economy leads to a drop in welfare. The author's analysis sheds some light on the political economy of protection. Particularly, it suggests that trade liberalization is more likely to raise welfare in the Latin America case when its accompanied by changes in labor market institutions.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Access to Markets,Markets and Market Access

AN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKET MODEL OF THE U.S. LETTUCE INDUSTRY

An econometric model was specified to represent the U.S. lettuce industry. Cursory examination of the industry structure suggests that imperfect competition may prevail in the lettuce market. Therefore, relations were specified that allowed for the possibility of imperfectly competitive behavior to affect market equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, a supply price equation was specified to account for the influence of market power of large growers, particularly during seasons of geographically concentrated production. Results do not contradict the hypothesis that imperfect competition exists in the lettuce market.Industrial Organization,